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Few democratic countries have lower rates of female political representation than Japan,
making it an excellent place to seek clues for female underrepresentation. We were
surprised to find, based on three experimental surveys, that Japanese voters do not harbor
particularly negative attitudes toward female politicians. The problem instead appears to
be that women are reluctant to run for office because of socially mandated family roles.
An implication of our study is that gender equality in political representation will likely
founder in countries with electoral systems that require around-the-clock constituency
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service and legislative work, at least until citizens no longer have gendered expectations
about time-consuming family obligations.
Keywords: female representation, Public Opinion, Japan
I n every rich democracy in the world, women are underrepresented inpolitical office. Optimists of every generation who expected that gender
equality was “just around the corner” have been disappointed. Gender
equality is not, apparently, simply a matter of waiting for a new cohort of
liberated women to move through the ranks. The pipeline to the top
echelons in every field of endeavor seems to leak more women than men.
In this article, we seek to understand low female political representation
from both the demand side (voters) and the supply side (candidates). Party
leaders who recruit candidates to run for office may or may not have
prejudices of their own. We bypass the gatekeeper issue on the grounds
that if voters are biased against female politicians, party leaders will avoid
recruiting females in the first place to avoid electoral penalty. If citizens
prefer male to female representatives for whatever reason, party leaders’
hands may be tied: they will be forced to cater to bias. On the other hand,
as we argue here, party leaders will find it harder to achieve gender
equality if women are reluctant to put themselves forward as candidates.
To understand voters’ views of female candidates as well as women’s
willingness to run for public office, we employed three original survey
experiments and one existing survey in Japan. In the first conjoint survey
experiment, designed to gauge attitudes toward women in politics, we
found no systematic gender bias even in Japan, where every indicator
points to significant gender inequality. In the second, to corroborate the
conjoint experiment, we used a measure of attitudes toward competence
and indeed found that Japanese voters do not view females as being less
capable than men.
Next, to examine the candidacy self-selection process in politics, we
employed one existing survey about candidates for national elections and
one original survey experiment. In the existing survey, we found that not
all women are equally unlikely to run for office, but some groups of
women are disproportionately less likely to run for national elections. The
results suggest that women choose not to run for office largely on account
of socially mandated responsibilities for child care and household work.
To confirm this interpretation, we conducted an original survey
experiment and found that, compared with men, women are more likely
to run for office when they receive substantial support for family work.
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The severity of Japan’s female underrepresentation makes it a particularly
useful window through which to probe the causes of gender inequality
elsewhere. Female politicians accounted for about 12.6% of all elected
national lawmakers in late 2016, the second-lowest share among OECD
countries after Turkey (Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d.). Only 44 of 475
members of the House of Representatives (lower house) were women, or
9.4%. This put Japan at 164th out of 193 countries and well behind all
other developed countries, including other laggards such as Turkey
(131st), Chile (128th), and South Korea (116th). In the House of
Councillors (upper house), the percentage of women was slightly higher,
at 20.7%, but according to Takazawa (2015), this placed Japan only 17th
out of 19 among second houses of bicameral legislatures. Unlike many
democracies, Japan also lacks statutory candidate gender quotas.1
This article’s contributions are twofold. First, our study of the
underexamined case of Japan deepens our understanding of what may
promote or hinder gender equality in politics. In particular, our finding
that voters have little bias against female candidates is consistent with
recent studies elsewhere (Dolan 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2016; Teele,
Kalla, and Rosenbluth n.d.), but it is even more significant because
Japan manages to have one of the worst records of female
underrepresentation without voter bias. The finding is also important
because of evidence that quotas help voters view women as suited to
govern (Besley et al. 2017; McDonagh 2009). Because Japanese voters
seem not to have gender bias even without gender quotas, we focus
more on supply-side dynamics. Moreover, Japan is a less polarized polity
than the United States, where most studies of voter bias have been
conducted. The weak effect of gender on vote choice in the United
States could be an artifact of partisan polarization that dampens the
importance of other variables such as candidate gender (Dolan 2014). If
gender has a weak effect on vote choice in Japan as well, we have greater
confidence that we are capturing gender attitudes rather than partisanship.
Second, this study has important policy implications. If it is true that
supply-side factors better account for female political underrepresentation,
then emphasis should be on fielding more female candidates. But the
article also highlights the challenges of recruiting more women. As
long as women’s and men’s notions about the appropriate division of
1. Most of Japan’s major parties also lack internal rules for candidate gender quotas. As of writing, the
sole exception is the Social Democratic Party, which introduced candidate gender quotas in its party
rules in 1996 (Miura 2014).
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household work do not change, women know that they face formidable
obstacles, discouraging all but the most intrepid. This is consistent with
findings that female politicians feel that they have to be better than their
male counterparts (Fox and Lawless 2005) and that perhaps many are
(Anzia and Berry 2011; Besley et al. 2017).2
If, on top of female reticence to run for office, gatekeepers also hinder
female recruitment, gaining representational equality for women is a
daunting prospect (see, e.g., Bjarnega˚rd and Kenny 2016; Fox and
Lawless 2010; Niven 1998, 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Quotas can
bypass recruitment bias, but incumbents may have an incentive to resist
the introduction of gender quotas in the first place (Krook and
Zetterberg 2014). Therefore, future comparative studies should seek to
understand the full range of impediments that female candidates face
and how best to address those impediments.
ARGUMENT
Culture — the accumulated social values and practices by which a society
understands and orders itself — is an undeniably powerful force in human
affairs. Travelers intuitively grasp the importance of the “choreography” of
culture when they enter a new country and ignore at their peril a vast array
of unspoken rules about proper decorum. In some societies, for example,
the free expression of opinions is honored; in others, it is taken as a sign
of poor manners and low breeding. Social mores, it is clear to any keen
observer, vary along an astonishing range of dimensions.
Like every other component of culture, attitudes toward women vary
considerably across countries, but they are consistent in one respect: the
status of women is lower than that of men in virtually every country in
the world. We take this as a clue that gender attitudes are not
constructed within each society out of its own thin air but are anchored
in some common aspects of modern human life.
To develop our theoretical argument, we draw on the literature on
gender bias in the workplace. A growing body of scholarship has found
that gender equality tracks the demand for female labor in the workforce.
Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Becker (1991) show theoretically that
female wages should be lower as long as males are more likely to invest
2. Ono (2015) reports that female legislators in Japan submit more questions to the cabinet than their
male counterparts. He finds no difference between women and men in the number of questions asked
at the committee level or in number of bills sponsored.
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in marketable human capital. Lundberg and Pollak (1996) argue that
female bargaining power in the home is higher when women have
outside income. In their extensive empirical work, Goldin (1990, 1991,
2014) and Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) demonstrate empirically
that the gender wage gap is smallest in professions in which one person
is substitutable for another (such as medical group practices), making it
possible for women to tailor their working hours to suit their preferences
for family-career balance. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006, 2010) find that
gender equality, even within the same country, differs from one sector to
another depending on the costs to the firm (or to voters) of career
interruption for family work. These findings, taken together, point to the
conclusion that, as the adage goes, “time is money.” As long as females
bear a disproportionate share of child-rearing and elder care, and in fields
in which continuous availability for work contributes to the development
of valued human capital, women will lag men in career advancement.
The massive technological transition from Fordism to a knowledge-
based economy in recent decades should help women by putting a
premium on general skills that are mobile across firms, untethering
worker productivity from years of acquiring firm-specific human capital
(Iversen and Soskice 2015). Still, time is money at the high end of the
service economy. Client-based work in the service sector often requires
around-the-clock availability, and acquiring a client or constituency
network, in business or in politics, often requires early years of career
investment that typically coincide with the reproductive years. Even
more perniciously for women, the difficulty of measuring productivity in
the knowledge economy — which often relies on teamwork — induces
firms to proxy employee productivity with hours spent on the job,
however unreliable a measure that may be.
If these studies are right, relevant variation in labor markets should be
associated with different outcomes for women. We should find fewer
women in professions that require large time commitments during
childbearing years.
These insights can be applied to female political underrepresentation.
First, on the demand side, voters may underappreciate female politicians
if they perceive politics as being time-intensive work — politicians have
to work around-the-clock to attend plenary and committee meetings,
meet constituencies and bureaucrats, build strong political machines,
and run electoral campaigns, for example. If voters believe that women
cannot, or should not, work as much as men because of family
obligations, voters will punish female candidates, in particular those with
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young children, more than male politicians. In other words, voters-as-
employers may be less willing to “invest” in female politicians if they
believe that they will get less work out of female politicians than male
politicians. Indeed, studies have uncovered evidence of voter bias against
female politicians in many countries (Fox and Smith 1998; Inglehart
and Norris 2003; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Sanbonmatsu 2002),
although the empirical evidence as to the extent to which this bias
impacts actual vote choice has been mixed (Lawless and Pearson 2008).
Scholars have found mixed evidence of voter bias against female
candidates in the Japanese context as well. Kawato (2007a) and Ono and
Yamada (2016) find that voter bias among Japanese voters indeed exists,
while Takeyasu (2002) and Aiuchi (2007) fail to uncover systematic bias
against female politicians among Japanese voters.
By contrast, a growing body of studies have found that it is not voter bias
that deters female representation in politics but rather that women are less
likely to run for office in the first place — precisely because time is money.
From this perspective, the roots of female political underrepresentation are
to be found in the supply side rather than the demand side. Studies have
pointed to the more limited supply of qualified female candidates,
specifically better-educated professional women compared with men in
most countries, to explain why fewer women than men run for office
(Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Matland 1998; Rule 1981).3 But more
recent studies have noted that a growing pool of better-educated
professional women is not sufficient for women to run for office in large
numbers because, in many countries, women bear the brunt of the
responsibility for child-rearing and housework (Lawless and Fox 2005;
Silbermann 2015).4 If women know that they will not be able to put in
as many hours as a male politician because of their obligations at
home, they may choose not to enter politics in the first place. If
women are more concerned about family obligations than men, we
should observe, on average, fewer women than men in politics.
Furthermore, as a result of temporal variation in childbirth and child-
rearing, we should see fewer female politicians entering politics around
reproductive age.
3. Other studies have found mixed or weak evidence that a greater supply of better-educated
professional women leads to more women in legislatures (Norris 1985; Paxton 1997; Tripp and Kang
2008).
4. In addition to time considerations, recent studies have found that women self-select out of politics
because they have less confidence in themselves and perceive that they will face gender discrimination
in politics (Fox and Lawless 2011; Hayes and Lawless 2016).
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Studies of female underrepresentation in Japan have also pointed to the
importance of supply-side factors. Drawing on mass survey data of
individuals’ willingness to run for office, Masuyama (2007) argues that
while more education strengthens respondents’ willingness to run, the
effect is weaker among women than among men. Tsuji (2017) concurs
on the importance of education and argues that the increase in the
supply of “qualified” female candidates in recent decades has
contributed to the increase in female mayors in Japan (see also Ogai
2001). Takeyasu (2002) finds that internalized social norms as well as
expectations from family members and the local community present
substantial obstacles for women to run for office. While Takeyasu
examined the impediments that discouraged women from running for
office at the local level, her findings are likely to be relevant to the
national level as well (see Eto 2010; Miura 2016).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our empirical strategy entails two steps, which we summarize here before
explaining it in greater detail in the following sections. First, to ascertain
whether voters in Japan harbor gender bias (which we are calling the
demand side, hereafter Study 1), we employed two survey experiments
designed to avoid social desirability bias, which would give us false
results. A conjoint survey asked respondents to choose a preferred
candidate from a series of pairs with randomly scrambled attributes
(Survey 1); another survey experiment, which complements Survey 1,
examined people’s perceptions of female and male capabilities (Survey 2).
To investigate possible supply-side gender selection bias (we call this
Study 2), we analyzed a publicly available survey of all candidates in
general elections (Survey 3). To corroborate the mechanism through
which women self-select out of politics, we conducted an additional
survey experiment randomizing different incentives and constraints
affecting people’s willingness to run for office (Survey 4).
STUDY 1: DEMAND-SIDE GENDER BIAS
Survey 1: Conjoint Analysis
Our two-wave survey embedded with a conjoint experiment captured a
nationally representative sample of 1,611 Japanese adults between
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January and March 2015.5 The first wave of the survey consisted of basic
demographic questions and key covariates, including general attitudes
toward women and other relevant measures such as personality traits and
social dominance orientation. After a two-week period, we reinterviewed
the same respondents in the second wave, which included the conjoint
survey.
In the second wave, each survey respondent was asked to choose between
pairs of hypothetical politicians with a randomized combination of
attributes along the dimensions of gender, age, education, and other
relevant information.6 By examining these responses, we are able to
gauge the extent and shape of biases against particular attributes or
combinations of attributes. The 1,611 respondents were asked to perform
the conjoint exercise six times for two profiles, for a total of 19,332
observations (each scenario consists of 9,666 observations). All
respondents were shown the scenarios in the same order.
Respondents were asked to choose which of the two candidates they
would personally prefer to see elected as a member of the House of
Representatives7 and which of the two politicians they would personally
prefer to see promoted as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader
(see O’Brien 2015). Since the LDP was the incumbent political party in
Japan’s parliamentary system at the time of the survey, the question
wording for the second scenario meant that respondents were indirectly
being asked to choose the prime minister.
We selected attributes that are relevant to each survey task. For the “Elect
a Politician” scenario, we laid out nine dimensions: gender, political party,
consumption tax policy, priority area in policy, age, prior experience,
education level, number of children, and marital status. For the
5. The sample was randomly drawn by Research Now from its opt-in online panel. The sample was
tailored to mirror the general population along demographic dimensions of age, gender, residential
locations, income level, and education level.
6. Conjoint analysis was originally developed in the field of marketing to gather and assess views about
possible combinations of attributes in consumer products. Political scientists have recently found
conjoint analysis useful in analyzing multidimensional choices (see, e.g., Ballard-Rosa, Martin, and
Scheve 2017; Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2018).
7. Each profile was prefaced with brief instructions: “This study considers who should be elected to a
House of Representatives seat. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to act as if you were a
voter of her or his district. We will provide you with several pieces of information about each candidate
who might run for the seat. For each pair of candidates, please indicate which of the two candidates you
would personally prefer. This exercise is purely hypothetical. But even if you are not entirely sure, please
indicate which of the two you prefer.” See Table A in the online appendix for a sample image of
the question.
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“Promoting a Politician” scenario, we chose six dimensions: gender, age,
prior experience, education level, number of children, and marital status.
For example, the “Political Party” attribute of the first scenario can take
one of five values: LDP, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Komeito,
Japanese Communist Party, or Restoration Party (Ishin no To). For each
profile, the two politicians’ profiles varied both within and across the
binary comparisons. We also randomized the order of the attributes
presented to respondents in a given comparison so as not to affect
respondents’ choices. (For attributes, see Tables B and C in the
supplementary appendix in the online version of this article).
The forced-choice design allows us to isolate respondents’ calculations
while controlling for respondents’ overall attitudes about politics. We
construct the binary response variable Person Preferred as our dependent
variable and code it 1 if a respondent chose the politician and 0
otherwise. Our primary substantive focus is to estimate the average
marginal component effect (AMCE) of a change in values of the
attributes on the probability that the person is chosen by the respondent
(Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Under the conditional
independent randomization of attribute values, the AMCE can be
estimated using a linear regression model. We regress the Person
Preferred variable on a set of dummy variables flagging each value. The
coefficient for each variable can be interpreted as the average change in
the probability that a respondent will choose the profile when it includes
the attribute value relative to the baseline attribute value. We report
standard errors for these estimates clustered by respondents to account for
within-respondent correlations in responses.
This experimental design allows us to isolate which attributes
respondents deem most important for political office. We are also able to
avoid selection effects on the women who choose to run for office, since
some attributes may be rarely observed in practice. For example, women
with preschool-age children may be judged unfit for political office. In
the political world, women candidates potentially face a triple whammy:
having young children makes them less available for around-the-clock
political activities, but not having a family may make them socially odd
and politically suspect; on top of that, being older (postfamily) comes
with the liability of having had less time to build seniority and political
clout (Silbermann 2015). By exploiting family-related attributes, we can
measure whether and how Japanese institutions prevent women from
working as politicians.
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Figure 1 reports the baseline results of both scenarios.8 Strikingly for a
country with an exceedingly small number of female politicians,
Japanese respondents preferred female to male candidates for election to
the House of Representatives. In substantive terms, a female politician
was 4 percentage points (SE ¼ 0.01) more likely to be preferred as a
member of the Diet than the male counterpart.
In choosing political leaders, most respondents also viewed women
as favorably as men. Male politicians were slightly preferred to their
female counterparts, but the difference was not statistically significant at
the 10% level.9
To further probe whether Japanese voters judge female and male
candidates/politicians on a double standard, we interacted a number of
attributes with gender to rule out the possibility that some attributes are
important only for women. In fact, in the interaction term results for
FIGURE 1. Baseline Results: Effects of Attributes on Preference for a Politician.
Note: Each circle represents the estimate of the effect of the randomly
assigned hypothetical personal value on the probability of choosing a
hypothetical person, relative to the baseline value (i.e., the first value of
each attribute). The horizontal bars represent 90% confidence intervals
robust to clustering at the respondent level. The number of observations
is 9,666. The other attributes are not reported. See Figure A for the
full result.
8. Not all covariates are reported. See Figure A in the online appendix for the full result.
9. Conjoint analyses make a stability and no carryover effects assumption (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and
Yamamoto 2014), which means that respondents could choose the same candidate as long as the two
candidate profiles had identical attributes in the same choice task, regardless of previous or subsequent
choice tasks. Figure D in the online appendix shows separate analyses by each task and demonstrates
that estimates are similar across tasks in our analyses, thereby unlikely to violate the assumption. The
joint significant tests also confirm that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the AMCEs for the
gender attributes are identical across the tasks for both conjoint analyses. Further, the gender
attributes are not statistically significant in the first task for both analyses that are not contaminated
by carryover effects. Another concern about the validity of our conjoint analyses lies with whether
profiles in the analyses are realistic (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), and to reduce the
concern, we conducted a pilot study in October 2014 (N ¼ 600) so as to avoid atypical profiles in
designing the conjoint experiments.
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each attribute (see Figure B in the online appendix), we found striking
similarities between male and female politicians across most attributes.
Factors such as partisanship, policy positions, age, prior experience, and
marital status did not systematically disadvantage female relative to male
candidates. Female and male respondents also revealed very similar
attitudes (not shown).
It is also notable that respondents did not hold women candidates to
higher standards relative to their male counterparts. That is, female
candidates/politicians did not need to have achieved higher academic
qualifications or more extensive political backgrounds than their male
counterparts in order to be viewed as being fit for office or promotion.
We found some evidence that respondents preferred a female politician
to have older children (over age six) and for her to live in a
multigenerational family with built-in child care — belt and suspenders
on the home front, perhaps. But this preference was not stable across
different combinations of attributes. While a recent study found that
American voters prefer candidates who are married and have children
(Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth n.d.), Japanese voters exhibited no
preference regarding candidates’ marital status or number of children, for
female or male candidates. Respondents even seemed to cut females
some slack for the special challenges they face balancing family and
career, taking away fewer points from women than for men if they were
divorced.
As Sanbonmatsu (2002, 2004), Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013), and
others have noted in the U.S. context, voters often associate female
politicians with women’s issues. Over the past few decades, a “gender
voting gap” has opened up in rich democracies, whereby females and
especially working women are somewhat more likely than males to vote
on the left. In the Japanese context as well, some scholars have pointed
to a gender gap in support for the LDP (Burden 2008). This presumably
reflects the importance for working women of social policies such as
education and welfare that support family-work balance (Iversen and
Rosenbluth 2010, 125). Sanbonmatsu (2002, 2004) finds that voters with
a preference for left-leaning policies tend to prefer female politicians
because they believe that women are more likely to support their causes.
At least some of our Japanese survey respondents, too, favor female
politicians who championed welfare programs, although the difference
just misses statistical significance at the 10% level. Self-described liberals
are 16.3 percentage points (SE ¼ 0.10) more likely to support a female
candidate who embraces social welfare policies than nonliberals,
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although the difference again misses statistical significance at the 10% level
(see Figure C in the online appendix).
The fact that Japanese respondents do not expect female candidates to
differ in policy terms from male candidates contrasts with some findings
from the United States, where voters may associate female candidates
with “women’s issues” such as social policy or education and vote
accordingly (Dolan 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2002). But other studies have
argued that while voters may indeed harbor stereotypical views of female
and male candidates’ policy strengths, those stereotypes have limited
effect on actual voting decisions (Dolan 2014; Hayes 2011). Our study
lends support to the latter view, at least in the Japanese context.
To summarize, Survey 1 provides consistent support across the scenarios
and model specifications that voters do not discriminate against female
politicians even in Japan, suggesting that female underrepresentation does
not emanate from the demand side. Particularly notable is that
these findings come from a conjoint design, which reduces, if not
eliminates, the effect of social desirability bias. Still, to complement Survey
1, we conducted another survey experiment measuring people’s implicit
underestimation of women’s capabilities in a more general setting.
Survey 2: Student Memo Survey
Do Japanese believe that women are less competent than men? If negative
gender stereotypes in Japan are pervasive, our earlier voting scenarios could
have failed in spite of all efforts to tap this deep-seated source. A survey in
Japan found that less than a quarter of respondents thought that female
politicians are less competent than their male counterparts (Aiuchi
2007). But a large percentage of respondents chose the “DK/NA” option,
suggesting that social desirability bias may have been at work. Indeed,
the same survey found that almost half of respondents (46.0%) disagreed
that women and men are comparable in terms of job competence in any
type of job, whether politics or otherwise (Kawato 2007b). But Japanese
respondents’ assessments of “competence” may be colored by their
expectations that women should assume most of the responsibility for
hearth and home. To what extent do Japanese view women’s and men’s
job competence as equal, independently of both social desirability bias
and of social expectations of child-rearing?
To examine this question, along the lines of previous studies (Moss-
Racusin et al. 2012; Reeves 2014), we asked respondents to evaluate a
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memo written by a hypothetical college graduate seeking a first job. We
chose this setting because this is a common and recognizable one for
many people in Japanese society. Note that judging the capabilities of a
recruit for an entry-level position may be not the same as evaluating
politicians who assume greater responsibilities and exercise leadership.
Still, if we find gender bias for this entry-level setting, we can consider
this as evidence for demand-side-driven female underrepresentation.10
By contrast, finding little bias toward women in this setting would
complement Survey 1, lending confidence to move on to Study 2’s focus
on supply-side explanations.
For this experiment, we collected 202 responses from Japanese adult
citizens between October 15 and 17, 2014.11 Of the respondents, 52%
were women, and 48% were men. The respondents’ mean age was in
their forties, making them, on average, about 10 years younger than the
general Japanese public. However, this is fairly close to the mean age of
Japanese workers, which, as of 2013, was 42.8 (Somusho 2015). More
importantly, randomization generated balanced control and treatment
groups across relevant demographic indicators of age, gender, marital
status, children status, education level, and income level (see Table D in
the online appendix).
Each respondent was asked to evaluate, on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 4 (very
good), a single hypothetical research memo, on which the gender of the
hypothetical author was randomly scrambled. Respondents were asked to
take the perspective of a hiring official at a major trading firm assessing a
memo that had been submitted by a college senior who was applying for
an entry-level position with the possibility of future promotion to leadership
positions. The student memo was based on a college assignment to discuss
how the reunification of Germany impacted the configuration of German
environmental policies. The topic itself is not important here; rather, we
selected the memo so that it had little content that would lead respondents
to suspect that the purpose of the survey was to assess respondents’ gender
bias. Further, in order to increase the likelihood of confirmation gender
bias, we reversed the original order of the paragraphs (the memo has two
paragraphs in total) so that the memo is not well written.12 If gender bias
exists among the respondents in terms of capability, we expect that they are
10. This age group (i.e., around 22 years old) is not yet considered to have child-rearing
responsibilities, meaning that gender bias in this setting should be less likely to derive from the
expectation of family work.
11. A random sample was again drawn from the company Research Now’s opt-in online panel.
12. See the online appendix for the memo (translated version).
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more likely to punish the female author. By comparing evaluation scores for
each hypothetical author, we are able to see whether females are judged more
harshly than males. Since all respondents read the same essay, any differences
in evaluation can be attributed to gender bias.
To our considerable surprise, female authors were not docked for their
gender. On average, the male author received an average assessment of
2.77 points on a four-point scale, and the female counterpart received
2.76 points. We also conducted a bivariate regression with no controls
(a t-test) to compare the two groups and confirmed that there was no
statistical difference between two groups at the 1% level; this null finding
is unlikely to be due to a possible type II error because of the relatively
small sample size.13
Moreover, the experiment showed that there was no statistically
significant difference in the scores given to female and male authors by
female or male respondents. It is not the case that male respondents
were more biased against female authors while female respondents were
not, canceling out the effects in the overall sample. Male respondents
were just as likely as female respondents to judge male and female
authors evenhandedly.
Of course, these results do not suggest that Japanese people are not biased
against women for any type of task. It is possible that the Japanese are not
biased against women’s abilities to write memos but that they are biased
against women’s abilities to perform other, more traditionally “masculine”
tasks, such as leadership, engineering, or winning client confidence.
Nevertheless, because memo writing is a fairly fundamental skill that is
correlated with other job-related skills such as communication or the
ability to organize complex thoughts (see Kuncel, Hezlett, and Ones
2004), it is a reasonable measure of overall competence.
The results also corroborate our finding from Survey 1 that Japanese do
not view female candidates to be less competent than their male
counterparts. Because Survey 2 was about the evaluation of capabilities
of college seniors, the result may not be readily generalizable to
politicians.14 Still, combined with the findings of Survey 1, this study
suggests that most Japanese do not think females are less capable in a
13. In order to see a significant difference between the two groups at the 5% level, we would have to
have a sample size of more than 100,000 (with 80% statistical power). We also conducted the same test
but with a different author’s name from a different country: with a similar sample size, we found a
statistically significant bias against foreign authors.
14. Because of possible differences in responsibilities, drawing on the null finding of Study 2, we
might be most likely to underestimate capability-driven gender bias in the political setting. But the
fact that the findings of Study 2 are in line with Study 1 suggests that underestimation is unlikely.
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general sense than males, indicating that we need other explanations for the
female political underrepresentation than deep, internalized sexism.
In summary, gender bias among Japanese voters is remarkably weak.
This null result deepens the puzzle: why, then, does Japan observe a
dearth of women in office? Where does the empirical gap come from?
We turn to that question in the following section.
STUDY 2: SUPPLY-SIDE GENDER BIAS
Survey 3: Candidate Survey
If voters do not discriminate against female politicians, women themselves
may be self-selecting out of politics despite a fair chance of winning. This
raises the possibility that supply-side rather than demand-side factors
account for the small number of female politicians in Japan.
Japan’s mixed electoral system, which combines single-member districts
(SMDs) and proportional representation (PR), provides a window into the
calculus for women in politics. In the Japanese parliamentary system,
candidates for the lower house (which we will use for our analysis) are
allowed to run for both SMDs (N ¼ 295 as of 2017) and PR (N ¼ 180 as
of 2017), while voters cast two votes — one for the SMD tier and the
other for the PR tier. More specifically, the electoral system allows us to
take advantage of variation in the number of candidates across cohorts
and genders. If party leaders think that women are simply less competent,
we should find no difference in the number of female candidates across
age groups, although the overall number of female candidates may be
higher in PR than SMD, since PR systems generally tend to encourage
minority representation. On the other hand, as we hypothesized, if
women worry about family responsibilities, we should see fewer female
candidates around reproductive age — despite the fact that this is the key
age for men to enter politics. More dramatically still, we should see
differences in the percentages of women running in districts and on lists.
Since an SMD system requires, on average, individual candidates to
engage in more individual campaigning and constituency work than a
PR system (see Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Kittilson and Schwindt-
Bayer 2010), SMD systems should further discourage female candidates
with young children.15
15. A large percentage of SMD candidates are also listed in PR. But this “dual candidacy” does not
fully account for the low number of female candidates in Japan because some parties have been more
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Christensen (2008) finds that more female politicians are elected via the
PR portion of Japan’s electoral system than the SMD portion. Miura (2016)
reports that the percentage of female candidates is higher among those
running solely from PR (almost 25%), while it is lower among candidates
that run solely from SMDs and those running both from PR and SMDs
(roughly 15% of candidates, respectively). We build on these studies to
probe whether, and to what extent, this difference in Japanese women’s
willingness to run from different portions of the electoral system is driven
by their family obligations.
We test these expectations using a survey conducted jointly by the
University of Tokyo and Asahi newspaper (UTokyo-Asahi Survey
[UTAS]). The survey collected information about all candidates,
including both incumbents and challengers, for all the Lower House
elections between 2003 and 2014. The high response rate of 95% in
2014 (N ¼ 1,132) alleviates concern about selection bias among
respondents. In all, 604 of 1,132 respondents were first-time candidates.
We found that women of reproductive age were less likely to run for
office. Figure 2 compares the distributions of male and female first-time
candidates in the 2014 lower house election for both SMD and PR
districts. As shown in Figure 2, female candidates of reproductive age
were less likely to run for office in SMDs compared with their male
FIGURE 2. Distributions of first-time candidates’ age for the 2014 election, by
gender.
eager to field female candidates than others, even as they have allowed SMD candidates to be placed on
the PR list. For instance, in the 2014 general elections, the DPJ had a higher percentage of dual
candidates (89.4%) than the LDP (77.3%). But the DPJ had a higher percentage of female
candidates (14.6%) than the LDP (11.9%).
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counterparts. This pattern disappeared on the proportional list, even
though the very same voters were choosing both. We also extended the
time period and examined the age distributions of male and female first-
time candidates in the last three general elections (2009, 2012, 2014)
(see Figure E in the online appendix). The sample sizes were 845, 953,
and 604 for the 2009, 2012, and 2014 elections, respectively. For all
three elections, the age distributions of candidates by gender across the
electoral systems were significantly different based on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of distribution equality.
The results suggest that certain women indeed self-select out of politics
more than others. If SMD systems require politicians to spend more time
on campaigning and constituency service, it is not hard to see that this
would discourage female candidates with young children. Many male
candidates choose to run for the first time around age 40, not least
because entering national politics around this age ensures that politicians
will be able to serve enough terms that they will be considered for
ministerial positions by the time they retire. But most Japanese women
around age 40 are saddled with child-rearing responsibilities, and this
discourages them from making a run at politics. For women running
from SMDs, the modal age for first-time candidates is around 60, just
when many women are finished child-rearing. As we would expect, this
pattern attenuates for candidates running from PR districts, where
women tend to enter politics at an earlier age.
Female politicians themselves may not be a good source of information
about the barriers to female political ambition, since they are the select
few who survived the gauntlet. Like fish who do not know they are
swimming in water, successful female politicians may or may not
understand what makes them special. But according to a recent poll,
even they have some inkling: 51% of the female respondents from a poll
of the House of Representatives reported that the social obligation to care
for children or elderly parents prevents many women from becoming
politicians, and 41% of them believed that many women on the path to
office face opposition from family members and relatives.16
Survey 4: Recruitment Survey
Survey 3 suggested that women are less likely to run for office when they have
to take care of children and household chores. To nail down the mechanism,
16. Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 2015.
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we conducted a survey experiment in which we asked members of the general
public whether they would consider running for a general election. Since
Survey 3 targeted only those individuals who had already made the
decision to run for office, Survey 4 aims to expand the scope of the study to
the general public and reduce the concern of selection bias.
We undertook this survey with a nationally representative sample of
3,206 Japanese adults between December 21 and 27, 2016.17 The survey
consisted of basic demographic questions, key covariates including
general attitudes toward the role of women in the society and interests in
politics, and an experimental component.
In the experimental component, all respondents received a version of
stimulus information to encourage running for a hypothetical general
election, but the specific stimulus that each respondent received varied
depending on treatment groups to which respondents were randomly
assigned. As common baseline information, respondents in the control
group received a message that a hypothetical political party is looking for
a candidate like themselves who share the party’s basic ideology,
suggesting that they would be an ideal candidate for the party. We also
controlled for a good winning rate and generous financial incentives.
In addition to a control group, we had two main treatment groups. To test
our “time is money” hypothesis, we told respondents in one of the treatment
groups that they would receive support from the party for household tasks
during her or his electoral campaign, while those in the other treatment
group were told that they would not receive such support. With this
stimulus manipulation, the survey experiment was intended to test whether
the existence or absence of support for household chores encourages or
discourages respondents to run for office.18 Since encouragement from a
party leader may influence women’s decisions to run (Karpowitz, Monson,
and Preece 2017), we told respondents in the treatment groups that party
members were impressed with their qualifications so that we could boost
their willingness to run.19
Overall, our empirical analysis for Survey 4 found that encouragement
from the political party, on average, increased respondents’ willingness to
17. The sample was randomly drawn by a Japanese survey firm, Nikkei Research, from its opt-in online
panel. We made the sample as close as possible to the general population by stratifying with
demographic variables of age, gender, and residential locations in the direction of representativeness.
18. To control for gender bias in fundraising support (Kitchens and Swers 2016), we also told
respondents in all the treatment groups that financial support would be provided by the party.
19. To examine the effect of positive encouragement or positive framing effect, we also included other
treatment groups that received a negative message about respondents’ qualifications, but we did not find
a statistical difference for the effect of encouragement in general (not reported).
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run for the hypothetical election. Further and more importantly, we found
that the existence of household support during the electoral campaign was
more likely to increase their willingness. Breaking down the results by
respondents’ gender, we found that the latter result was largely driven by
female respondents. Figure 3 shows that only female respondents were
more likely to run for the election with such support (the effect is
statistically significant at the 5% level), while the existence of the support
made no difference for male respondents. This suggests that women are
more likely to run for an election when they are less burdened by
household obligations. However, note that the figure also shows that
male respondents, on average, were more likely to run for election than
female respondents across all the three groups, suggesting either that
household support alone cannot explain the entire variation or that the
amount of household support hypothetically on offer is insufficient to
change expectations.
We further found that offering help for household work had the greatest
effect on female respondents between the ages of 25 and 34 (see Figure F
in the online appendix). The difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level.20 As shown in the analysis of the UTAS, this was precisely the age
FIGURE 3. Effect of time support on the willingness of running for a general
election.
20. Although our experimental design cannot control for a possibility that those in the treatment group
with the household support might have taken the help as a sign of the party’s enthusiasm (see Dar-
Nimrod and Heine 2006 for the effect of discouraging messages on women), our findings about the
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when many men entered politics but women did not. The effect of offering
help with housework was less marked for other age groups. The analysis
shows that offering support for housework could potentially make an
important difference in recruiting women into politics, especially
because entering politics during this early age allows women to have
longer and potentially more powerful political careers.
Recall from Study 1 that this concern over household chores was not shared
by voters. Voters did not systematically discriminate against female candidates,
even those with small children, implying that the greater effect of support for
household work among female compared with male respondents does not
stem from respondents’ worries over what voters may think. But this also
does not mean that women’s concerns about household work are self-
imposed. Even if voters do not punish, or even reward, female candidates at
the polls, any given Japanese man may not want his own spouse to drop
her housework in pursuit of a political career. A Japanese government
survey found that Japanese men spend, on average, an hour and seven
minutes a week on housework, a far lower figure compared with most other
developed democracies (Naikakufu n.d.). The corresponding figure is two
hours and 18 minutes for American men, two hours and 10 minutes for
British men, two hours and 21 minutes for French and German men, and
two hours and 29 minutes for Swedish men (Eurostat 2004).
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have looked for evidence that voters are to blame for the
failure of Japanese women to gain anything close to equal representation
in Japanese democratic politics. We have dramatically failed to find that
evidence for demand-side explanations: politicians’ gender was not an
important factor in Japanese voters’ voting decisions. Instead, our
empirical analyses point to the decision by women not to run in the first
place, on account of heavy family duties and expectations. These findings
lend support to studies by Takeyasu (2002) and Aiuchi (2007) that have
also failed to uncover voter bias against female candidates but have
pointed to supply-side factors in explaining female underrepresentation in
Japan. Voters and the political gatekeepers who seek to maximize party
votes should welcome more women to run for office but they have not
offered a viable way to reduce household work for women or to change
male/female difference and cohort difference indicate that our interpretation about the effect of
household support, not enthusiasm of the party, is more plausible.
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gender-based social expectations. Female underrepresentation in Japan
continues, unabated.
The policy implications of our findings are stark: women will not make
significant headway in Japanese politics until both women and men reduce
women’s and raise men’s obligations in the family. Additional child care
support in the form of subsidies and greater availability may help, but it
is hard to conceive of how much support for public child care can make
up for expectations of around-the-clock working hours and uninterrupted
years of human capital development.
One solution that is sometimes proposed to address the underrepresentation
of women in Japan is to introduce quotas (Miura 2014), given their success
elsewhere (Tripp and Kang 2008). In Japan, gatekeeping effects vary across
parties: in the absence of quotas, the center-right LDP fielded women in
7.8% of its SMDs in the 2014 general elections, compared with the
center-left DPJ’s 15.7% (Somusho 2014). The findings presented in this
article show that Japanese parties across the political spectrum would
benefit from introducing gender quotas and from fielding more women.
In fact, Japan’s opposition parties have been eager to introduce a statutory
quota system, and in 2016, four major opposition parties submitted a
quota bill for national and local legislatures.21 Lacking support from the
ruling LDP, this effort failed, but a quota system could in the future
provide part of the solution to introduce more women into public office.
Caul (2001) points to a chicken-and-egg problem that gender quotas are
more likely to be adopted in countries that have more women among the
party leadership. Given the formidable obstacles in the path of Japanese
women candidates, the pressure to adopt meaningful quotas will have to
be greater still.
The expectation that women bear primary responsibility for the family is
the deepest cultural value in this set of equations, but it does not exist in a
vacuum. As long as the decks are stacked against female success, many
women will choose to avoid the fruitless battle, thereby reinforcing social
expectations about what it is to be a normal Japanese woman. Implicit
bias is reinforced with every female failure against the odds.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1743923X18000223.
21. Mainichi Shimbun, December 2, 2016.
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